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1. Introduction 
The Paris Agreement attracted unprecedented media 
attention and was hailed by its creators as well as 
many observers as a watershed event, instrumental in 
contributing to a much-needed green global transition. 
Meeting in New York on April 22, the countries of the 
world demonstrated their overwhelming support for 
the Agreement—a strong signal of growing interna-
tional commitment. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether these good intentions will translate into actual 
emissions reductions. Experiences from more than 25 
years of UN climate diplomacy indicate that this is by 
no means self-evident: greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions today are more than 50% higher than when the 
UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 (Andresen, 2015). Will 
the Paris Agreement be able to break this trend? 
That gives rise to the tricky question of how to 
measure the effects of international institutions—how 
and to what extent do they contribute to problem-
solving effectiveness (Underdal, 2002)? Careful pro-
cess-tracing is required, as behavior may be the result 
of various other factors than the regime in question. 
This methodological approach can be applied when an-
alyzing the climate regime from its initiation until the 
present. But, with the ink hardly dry on the Paris 
Agreement (hereafter: PA), the best we can do now is 
to discuss its potential effectiveness. 
Here we have chosen to discuss the potential effect 
on the EU and international carbon markets, with spe-
cific attention to the EU emissions trading system (EU 
ETS) as the biggest market so far. While the former 
case illustrates the impact on climate policy in general, 
the latter case shows how this plays out as to a specific 
policy-instrument. Our choice of the EU may be con-
sidered a “critical case”, given its role as front-runner in 
the UN process. The PA can be expected to have ef-
fects on most states that had no previous emissions 
commitments. Will it also have effects on the most 
ambitious actor in the process, the EU? Regarding in-
ternational carbon markets, the increased involvement 
and pressure on various business and industry actors 
have been hailed as major elements of the PA (Haas, 
2015). Can we expect a further boost in carbon mar-
kets in its wake? 
Potential effectiveness will depend on at least two 
conditions: a certain “distance” between PA require-
ments and the status quo; and influence through polit-
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ical, legal, and administrative/bureaucratic pathways 
(Cortell & Davis, 1996). These pathways are by no 
means mutually exclusive and may very well co-exist. 
First, there is the legal pathway whereby international 
rules and procedures become incorporated in domestic 
law; this may affect the interactions between govern-
mental and societal actors. Second, the political path-
way directs attention to how government officials and 
societal actors can invoke international political decla-
rations to further their own specific interests in domes-
tic policy debates. Hence, international institutions or 
regimes may serve as “agents of internal realignments” 
(Levy, Young, & Zurn, 1995, p. 307). In essence, inter-
national institutions might affect the alignment of do-
mestic groups endeavoring to influence a government's 
behavior. Consequently, institutions can heighten state 
concern by magnifying public pressure in reluctant 
states (Haas, Keohane, & Levy, 1993, p. 22). Similarly, 
governments may also be empowered to take action. 
The existence of international rules may be utilized for 
purposes of justifying own actions, or to question the 
legitimacy of the actions of others. In particular, gov-
ernmental officials may cite international rules to legit-
imate unpopular decisions on stringent regulations. Fi-
nally, international institutional procedures may 
become enmeshed domestically through the standard 
operating procedures of bureaucratic agencies (Young, 
1989, pp. 78-79). This third pathway—the “bureaucrat-
ic/administrative” pathway—indicates how interna-
tional institutional procedures may affect domestic in-
stitutional procedures. 
Key observers have given generally positive evalua-
tions of the Paris Agreement, although they tend to 
underline different aspects. Bodansky (2015) stresses 
how the Agreement has injected new hope for the UN 
climate regime. Such increased legitimacy of the UN 
process may contribute to strengthen the legal path-
way through rapid ratification. Haas (2015) argues that 
the PA represents a new political approach, one in 
which the focus of attention is private sector innova-
tion and is subject to pressure from a constellation of 
other actors, including nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), social movements and the scientific communi-
ty as well as the UN itself. If this rather optimistic sce-
nario unfolds, it may contribute significantly to 
strengthening the political pathway. Victor (2015) 
strongly endorses the new hybrid architecture, arguing 
it will have a real impact on emissions, and that the PA 
will contribute to deeper commitments over time. 
However, he adds more detailed regulations are need-
ed to secure an effective and dynamic review system 
that can serve to increase incentives for continued 
emissions reductions. van Assselt (2016) underlines the 
key role non-state actors may play in this regard. If this 
can be achieved, it will also help to strengthen the bu-
reaucratic/administrative pathway by increasing non-
state actors’ access to decision-making. 
2. The Paris Agreement: A Brief Evaluation 
Prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the main 
legal instrument was the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyo-
to Protocol with its two commitment periods. The UN-
FCCC represented a necessary start of the process 
through its framework approach. The Kyoto Protocol 
was an innovative instrument with novel characteris-
tics, the flexible mechanisms. It also represented a step 
forward, with legally binding emission targets for the 
Annex 1 countries. At the time this made sense, as the 
countries of the Global North had main responsibility 
for creating the problem, and they were also the main 
emitters. However, since the Kyoto Protocol was adopt-
ed in 1997, emissions have been reduced in the North, 
while rising by some 160% in the South. Today, the in-
dustrialized countries with targets inscribed for the sec-
ond commitment period account for only 15% of total 
global emissions (Andresen, 2015). For the UN climate 
regime to enhance its problem-solving effectiveness, the 
regulatory scope would have to be increased. 
This was the background for radical new approach 
set forth in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord: a bottom–up 
approach based on a system of national pledges of non-
binding character without legal enforcement. Pledges 
were to be made by all countries, in contrast to the bina-
ry approach of the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement 
builds on and specifies this new approach. Considering 
the strong similarities between these two instruments, 
Bodansky (2015) has introduced the term “Copenparis”. 
Why was the former regarded as a fiasco, while Paris has 
been considered a success? Observers have pointed to 
the stark difference in process between the two events 
(see Haas, 2015; Victor, 2015). In Copenhagen, the Dan-
ish leadership was considered weak and even counter-
productive. In contrast, the French leadership is seen to 
have facilitated agreement though clever diplomacy be-
fore and during the negotiations. This helped to create 
broad ownership to the process and to build trust 
among parties. Bodansky (2015) agrees this may have 
had some positive effect. However, he claims, other fac-
tors are more important in explaining why a “Copenha-
gen look-alike treaty” was adopted in Paris. First, the 
main elements of the Accord had in practice been codi-
fied in the COPs between Copenhagen and Paris, so 
most parties had gradually realized this would be the 
main architecture of the new treaty. In this regard Ober-
thur and Groen (2016) add that no main actor wanted to 
take the blame for failure and that the US as well as Chi-
na and lesser climate powers were aligned towards the 
goal of reaching agreement. Secondly, key emerging 
countries had de facto accepted that in practice the Kyo-
to track was a dead issue —unlike in Copenhagen, where 
they still anticipated a continuation of the Kyoto Proto-
col. Finally, expectations were far more realistic in Paris. 
In Copenhagen many still hoped for an agreement with 
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strong legal bite. This was no longer the case. We can 
add a fourth reason: the vagueness of the Paris Agree-
ment made it easy to accept. This is reflected by the fact 
that all major parties, from the USA to the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS), with widely different inter-
ests and preferences, embraced the PA as a success. 
These factors explain why the Paris Agreement was 
widely accepted, but will this ‘Copenhagen look-alike’ 
set the world on a path to reduce emissions? That calls 
for a focus on aspects that set the Paris Agreement 
apart from the Copenhagen Accord. While the latter 
was a soft political document, the former is a treaty in 
the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Legal treaties can be expected to have more 
significance for the behavior of their members than 
soft political documents, although this is a complex 
question (Skjærseth, Schram Stokke, & Wettestad, 
2006). However, the practical significance of the PA’s 
legal force should not be exaggerated. For example the 
US administration firmly opposed being bound to the 
achievement of its declared target. Still, the PA is a 
treaty under international law and we argue that it is 
an advantage that the Paris Agreement is a legal treaty. 
While the Copenhagen Accord had entailed an al-
most pure “bottom–up” approach, in Paris agreement 
was reached on a more hybrid architecture. The parties 
are required to provide information about their pledg-
es to track progress as regards implementation. Of par-
ticular importance is that the parties are taking on Na-
tionally Determined Contributions (NDCs) when they 
ratify the PA. Furthermore it establishes a regular five-
yearly “stock-take” to be provided every five years 
from 2023 to be progressively more ambitious over 
time. This dynamic and transparent element is promis-
ing, but is also vulnerable, as much depends on the will 
and ability of countries to deliver on their pledges. Al-
so, a soft (top–down) approach has been chosen, as 
the PA has weak compliance mechanisms and no sanc-
tions. That makes it weaker than the Kyoto Protocol, 
but was probably necessary to get key actors on board. 
While the PA copies the Copenhagen goal of not 
exceeding a temperature increase of 2°C, it also adds 
the aspirational 1.5 °C target. As a point of departure, 
an ambitious goal is preferable to no goals or a goal 
than can be very easily reached. Ideally it may help 
members to the agreement to stretch further than 
they would otherwise do. However, it is important to 
have a match between the goal and the institutional 
underpinning necessary to reach the goal adopted. 
Judging from the pledges made so far, neither of these 
goals will be attained, so the Parties will have to ex-
pand their ambitions considerably in the future if the 
Paris Agreement is to live up to expectations. 
3. The EU: Before, in and after Paris 
Before Paris: Since the 1990s, the EU has aimed at 
showing leadership by example in the international 
climate regime. The credibility of this ambition has 
been strengthened by adding increasingly more ambi-
tious targets and policies and actual results on the 
ground. In 2007 and 2008, the EU leaders agreed on 
climate and related energy targets and binding policies 
for 2020, including cutting GHG emissions by 20 per-
cent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. Targets and pol-
icies for 2020 spurred the first step towards a long-
term strategy when, in 2009, the EU leaders agreed to 
support an EU goal of reducing GHG emissions be-
tween 80% and 95% by 2050 against 1990 levels (Euro-
pean Council, 2009). 
The European Commission used the 2009 “decar-
bonizing” by 2050 agreement as a foundation for step-
ping up long-term climate strategies. In 2011, it issued 
a roadmap for moving towards a competitive low-
carbon economy by 2050, showing that GHG emissions 
would have to be reduced by 40% by 2030 and 60% by 
2040, compared to 1990 levels (European Commission, 
2011). In October 2014, the 28 EU leaders apparently 
delivered on the low-carbon strategy by adopting a 
climate and energy policy framework for 2030, includ-
ing a new goal of domestic GHG reductions of at least 
40% compared to 1990 (European Council, 2014). They 
also agreed to “revert to” the issue after the Paris Con-
ference, indicating that the EU targets might be adjust-
ed in light of the outcome. By 2015, total EU GHG 
emissions were already 23% below 1990 levels—which 
also reflected various factors not directly related to 
climate policy, such as the activity-dampening effects 
of the economic crisis. 
Climate policies and achievements underpinned the 
leadership-by-example ambition when the EU prepared 
for the Paris Conference. The 40% by 2030 target served 
as the EU’s proposed NDC for the upcoming Paris meet-
ing. In September 2015, EU ministers adopted the EU’s 
negotiating mandate that also included preferences for 
an ambitious, transparent, dynamic, and legally binding 
agreement (including the NDCs) based on science. For 
the EU, “science” means the 2007 fourth assessment re-
port of the IPCC, which indicates that developed coun-
tries should reduce emissions by 80–95% by 2050 to lim-
it global warming to 2oC. For poor countries, financial 
support should be stepped up. 
While EU climate ambitions may appear impressive, 
they mask significant political tension and differing in-
terests within the EU. Poland and a group of Central 
and Eastern European countries dependent on domes-
tically produced coal do not favor the EU’s long-term 
climate ambitions. More concerned with energy securi-
ty, they have been playing along for the time being as a 
result of political pressure, derogations, and financial 
support. Another line of diverging interests goes be-
tween the energy-intensive industries that argue for a 
level playing field between the EU and major competi-
tors, and the electric power industry shielded from 
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competition outside Europe (Skjærseth, Eikeland, 
Gulbranden, & Jevnaker, 2016). It has also been argued 
that the EU’s climate strategy does not add up to the 
EU’s 2050 target (Dimantchev & Schjølset, 2016), but 
relies on uncertain technological improvements and 
the progressive up-scaling of efforts after 2030. 
In Paris: Internal political tensions represented a 
real risk of EU division during the Paris Conference. Po-
land had vetoed the 2050 strategy and opposed the 
EU’s negotiating mandate for COP21, but became iso-
lated after being granted concessions regarding some 
changes in wording that made no substantial differ-
ence (EurActive, 2015). Poland’s new, climate-skeptical 
conservative government initially also threatened to 
torpedo COP21, but changed its stance conditional on 
an outcome that would protect the interests of the 
Polish economy (Politico, 2015). That meant protection 
of coal—nearly 90% of Poland’s electricity is produced 
by mainly indigenous coal that feeds 53 coal-fired 
plants, with a dozen new ones expected to come on-
line before 2020 (Skjærseth, 2014). Despite initial op-
position, the EU managed to maintain considerable po-
litical unity throughout the Paris Conference, helping to 
build a “high-ambition coalition” that proved instru-
mental in achieving a dynamic agreement with all big 
emitters on board. Poland was pleased when refer-
ences to “phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies” were de-
leted from the PA text (CAN Europe, 2015). The Paris 
Agreement became more ambitious than the EU posi-
tion with its aspirational goal of limiting the tempera-
ture increase to 1.5oC. The dynamic element was, as 
noted, adopted with the addition of a “global stocktak-
ing” every five years from 2023 to consider progress in 
emissions reductions. The NDCs were not made bind-
ing, but the parties are legally obliged to pursue 
measures for meeting their contributions. 
After Paris: The 1.5 °C aspirational goal created a 
“distance” between the PA outcome and EU targets, 
policies, and position, which are based on the 2.0 °C 
goal. This gap provides the PA with the potential to af-
fect EU climate policy. Politically, the EU institutions re-
sponded immediately and enthusiastically to the Paris 
outcome. European Commission President Juncker de-
scribed the deal as “robust” and as a success for the 
EU. EU Climate and Energy Commissioner Cañete fol-
lowed up by praising the EU efforts to build a high-
ambition alliance, characterizing the deal as a major 
win for Europe (European Commission, 2015a). The Eu-
ropean Parliament delegation to COP21 called it an “un-
precedented breakthrough in the fight against climate 
change” and emphasized the need to follow up the  
1.5 °C goal by concrete policies (European Parliament, 
2015). Non-state actors with varying climate-policy in-
terests were supportive as well. BusinessEurope, with 
national business federation members across Europe, 
described the deal as a “major step forward,” but 
voiced concern that the agreement did not solve the is-
sue of competitiveness for European industries in highly 
competitive global markets (BusinessEurope, 2016). 
The electric power industry, represented by EURELEC-
TRIC, firmly welcomed the outcome, describing the 
deal as a “major landmark” (Eurelectric, 2015). The Eu-
ropean oil industry, and one of the least climate-
enthusiastic energy-intensive industries—steel—
welcomed the deal as well, but stressed the need for a 
strategy to provide a competitive level playing field and 
protect Europe’s industries from carbon leakage (Eu-
rofer, 2015; FuelsEurope, 2015). In their response, Eu-
rope’s largest green NGO coalition on climate and ener-
gy issues—Climate Action Network—listed the goods 
and not-so-goods, including the 1.5 °C target and the 
lack of binding country contributions, respectively (CAN 
Europe, 2015). 
The EU would “revert to” the 2030 framework after 
Paris. The positive responses to the dynamic long-term 
PA were used by “green” groups to argue for tighter EU 
targets and policies. In March 2016, the Commission 
responded formally with its Communication “The Road 
from Paris” (European Commission, 2016). The key 
message disappointed the green groups—the 2020 and 
2030 targets were to remain unchanged. The EU would 
participate in the first global stocktaking in 2023 and 
would consider more ambitious action beyond 2030. 
Priority number one in following up the PA would be to 
adopt binding policies on climate change (inclusion of 
Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry, revision of 
the EU Emissions Trading System and emission reduc-
tion in the non-trading sectors), renewables and ener-
gy efficiency—policies planned before the PA to fill the 
2030 framework with specific legislation. Further, the 
policy implications of the 1.5 °C goal must be ad-
dressed, and the EU would provide input to a special 
IPCC report on this issue in 2018. 
The member states discussed the Communication 
at their Environment Council meeting the same month. 
The Communication was broadly welcomed, although 
some ministers advocated higher ambitions (Environ-
ment Council, 2016). Many ministers highlighted the 
need to maintain the Paris momentum for adopting 
new 2030 policies and implementation. The subse-
quent EU leaders’ meeting became overshadowed by 
the migration crisis, but there was broad support for the 
Commission’s Communication (European Council, 2016). 
In summary, the main political impact of the PA thus far 
seems to be to justify EU climate policy and to legitimize 
the positions of the “frontrunners.” This will help to del-
egitimize opposition and make it more difficult for coun-
tries like Poland to question EU climate policy. 
As regards the legal aspects, the EU has signed the 
PA, and intends to ratify the treaty “as soon as possible” 
(European Commission, 2016, p. 4; European Council, 
2016). Combined with the legally binding obligation to 
pursue domestic measures, ratification of the PA will 
probably put pressure on “laggards” for swift adoption 
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of binding policies to deliver on the 2030 target. To en-
sure legitimacy, EU climate policies will need broad 
support, beyond qualified majority. The EU leaders 
have agreed to provide strategic orientation with re-
spect to consensus on the ETS and non-ETS (European 
Council, 2014). The main bureaucratic/administrative ef-
fect of the PA is likely to be its dynamic nature and glob-
al stocktaking mechanism. Although this mechanism was 
strongly favored by the EU, it will keep discussions warm 
concerning the match between current and planned pol-
icies and the EU’s 2050 “decarbonization” target. 
In conclusion, no EU political actor thus far has used 
the PA to argue for lower levels of ambition: indeed, 
the EU institutions, member states, industries, and the 
green movement have all argued for keeping or raising 
the level of short- and long-term ambitions. The 1.5 °C 
goal and the dynamic nature of the PA will trigger a fol-
low-up process that may lead to higher ambitions be-
yond 2030, particularly since uncertainty prevails on 
whether EU targets and policies add up to the EU’s 2050 
goal. The combination of political, legal, and bureaucrat-
ic/administrative consequences of the PA will increase 
the pressure on “laggards” within the EU to deliver on 
and support the 40% reduction target by 2030 and be-
yond. Carbon capture and storage (CCS), a key political 
solution for coal-based member states like Poland and a 
technological precondition for “decarbonization”, has 
failed across Europe, so the EU will need the PA to legit-
imate future unpopular decisions on stringent regulation 
(Skjærseth et al., 2016). The PA may contribute to keep 
climate at the agenda when the EU is dealing with a 
number of (other) internal and external crisis. However, 
it is far too early to pronounce on the actual longer-term 
impact of the Paris Agreement on the EU. 
4. Paris and Carbon Markets: Positive Implications—
But Help for a Struggling EU ETS? 
The EU ETS is the world’s largest carbon market to 
date, and has been in place for more than a decade. 
However, it has struggled with a carbon price that has 
been both volatile and too low to provide forceful in-
centives to a low-carbon transformation. 2015 saw the 
adoption of important structural reform of the EU ETS 
and of a global climate agreement. Thus, the scene was 
set for a positive development of carbon trading in 
general and within the EU in particular. Nevertheless, 
the European carbon price has since dropped. Alt-
hough additional tightening of the EU ETS has been 
suggested, this now seems to be a long shot. Having 
fought heavily to get the structural reform adopted last 
year (Wettestad & Jevnaker, 2016), the interest in re-
opening that can of worms is low. 
Moreover, after years of weak economic growth, 
the EU has not been willing to strengthen its overall 
climate targets in light of the PA, including the 1.5 °C 
ambition (see previous section). Despite the advent of 
a global climate agreement, the EU still regards carbon 
leakage a major issue. Shielding EU industries from cli-
mate policy in order to preserve their global competi-
tiveness remains important, indicating a “wait and see” 
attitude towards the bottom-up regime put in place by 
the PA. How could this be? In this section, we explore 
the interaction between the EU ETS reform process 
and the global climate regime along the legal, political 
and the administrative/bureaucratic pathways. 
The Paris Agreement includes elements of rele-
vance for carbon markets, as well as a review process 
that is intended to strengthen regional and domestic 
climate policy. The Paris meeting was not expected to 
give anything to carbon markets, but the implicit and 
explicit reference to elements associated with carbon 
markets gave rise to optimistic assessments as to the 
future of carbon trading. The term “market” was 
deemed too controversial to be mentioned explicitly in 
the Agreement itself (except when referring to non-
market approaches), although the term “carbon pric-
ing” appears in relation to non-party stakeholders in a 
COP decision accompanying the agreement, where it is 
referred to as a tool for incentivizing emission reduc-
tion along with domestic policies. Nevertheless, lan-
guage relevant to the development of carbon markets 
was included in the Paris Agreement. Here, coopera-
tion among countries in achieving their national cli-
mate policies (NDCs) was acknowledged: countries 
could cooperate on implementation by trading “inter-
nationally transferred mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs, 
Art. 6.2). Moreover, a mechanism for sustainable de-
velopment would be set up (Art. 6.4), building on pre-
vious global offsetting mechanisms (Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism and Joint Implementation), with the 
specific design to be decided at subsequent meetings. 
Beyond this, the PA included provisions for periodical 
review of national climate policies that were to be at 
least as ambitious as the previous version. 
What, then, will the PA entail for the subsequent 
development of carbon markets? In the following we 
will concentrate on its impact on the EU ETS, but let us 
first note a few points as to carbon markets more gen-
erally. This includes both the emergence of carbon 
markets individually and “collectively”, i.e. the pro-
cesses of linking them. The legal pathway is weak as to 
effects on individual carbon markets, although the PA 
offers language referring to carbon markets. There is 
nothing in the PA that requires countries to adopt and 
implement legislation for a carbon market. Thus, car-
bon markets will probably continue to emerge in frag-
mented and piecemeal ways, as in the past. However, 
the turn to emissions trading in China, today the 
world’s biggest emitter, is important, and could accel-
erate ETS adoption rates globally. China has already 
launched plans for a national ETS. Moreover, many 
countries’ INDCs included plans for carbon trading. To-
gether these two factors related to the legal pathway 
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from the PA—being voluntary and bottom-up rather 
than top-down and binding—could see enhanced co-
operation on this climate policy instrument. 
Additional support could come from a follow-up 
process from the PA on providing common guidance on 
carbon accounting rules. This is essential for the basic 
trust of data, and thus for linking processes to work. 
Although linking could offer cost-efficient emission re-
duction, there is no 1-to-1 relationship between func-
tionality and linking. In the past, prior cooperation be-
tween regions, countries, or sub-national entities has 
been important for linking emissions trading schemes, 
and differences in the design of carbon markets can 
pose challenges unless there is clear political will to 
make adjustments (Jevnaker & Wettestad, 2016). The 
legal pathway might also be activated where the PA is 
used by actors at the domestic or transnational arena in 
order to push for (more) ambitious caps and well-
functioning price management mechanisms. Finally, this 
might coincide with the administrative/bureaucratic 
pathway, as the five-year cycle of reviews offers oppor-
tunities for actors to utilize this window of opportunity 
for placing carbon-market issues on the political agenda. 
Turning to the EU carbon market, the PA was wel-
comed by proponents of a stronger EU ETS. Earlier the 
same year, the EU had finally agreed on a structural re-
form of its ETS in order to deal with a structural surplus 
that threatened to undermine the system as well as 
long-term climate targets. From 2019 onwards, a 
“market stability reserve” (MSR) would regulate supply 
by automatically withdrawing or releasing allowances 
should the total amount of allowances in circulation 
cross upper or lower thresholds. The road towards re-
form had been paved with daggers, first with contro-
versy as to whether or not to intervene in the carbon 
market at all, and then on how to intervene. 
It took a heavy load to turn this around: The Ger-
man election in 2013 resulted in a new coalition gov-
ernment accompanied by structural changes to the en-
ergy and environmental ministries. This moved 
Germany from being reluctant to supportive of carbon 
market reform. Moreover, bargaining deals in the (Eu-
ropean) Council and in the European Parliament were 
enabled in part because proposals were recalibrated to 
make them politically feasible, and in part due to con-
cessions given to Central and Eastern member-states, 
but also due to the display of power, with West Euro-
pean member states overruling Poland and some other 
CEECs, through majority voting in the final MSR rounds. 
More generally, the reform process was facilitated by 
European Council conclusions on the 2030 climate and 
energy policy, in preparation for the Paris climate 
summit (Wettestad & Jevnaker, 2016). 
As regards the international dimension, EU interest 
in exercising international climate leadership had 
pushed EU–internal policy development ahead of the 
international climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009 
(Boasson & Wettestad, 2013). However, this seemed to 
figure less prominently—and certainly in different 
manner—prior to Paris. Worried about meager eco-
nomic development after the financial crisis, with parts 
of Southern Europe still struggling, the EU was particu-
larly concerned with economic competitiveness and 
vulnerability, making it more inward-looking. The low 
hopes of achieving a binding climate agreement in Par-
is meant that the pull from the external context in the 
form of global climate negotiations was clearly less 
than in 2008, although it was not entirely absent (Wet-
testad & Jevnaker, 2016). 
Most observers expected that the adoption of the 
MSR would mark a turning point for an ETS in head-
wind since 2010. After meagre outlooks for the ETS 
price for several years, the carbon price now started 
climbing, slowly. More importantly, long-term expecta-
tions to the carbon price seemed likely to offer incen-
tives to changes in behavior (fuel-switching) with antic-
ipated levels of around €30–40 by 2030 (for an 
overview of the response to the MSR, see Wettestad & 
Jevnaker, 2016). As mentioned above, the PA was seen 
as offering further support. Nevertheless, 2016 saw the 
return of a gloomy outlook. The carbon price dropped 
from just above €8 euro to €5–6, settling at around €5. 
Price estimates for 2030 also dropped significantly. Re-
acting to the low price, in March 2016 France proposed 
introducing a price corridor to the ETS, whereby allow-
ances would be placed in the MSR if the price proved 
to be too low, and released if too high. This was de-
signed to avoid the spread of national measures like 
the UK carbon-price floor. The Environment Ministry in 
the key ETS country Germany responded by stating 
that it was open to discussion of further reform op-
tions, but that, rather than a price-based regulation (as 
proposed by France), it preferred to keep the quantita-
tive-based approach. Other tightening options, such as 
abolishing allowance banking between phases and a 
further tightening of the MSR parameters, have been 
put forward (see Carbon Pulse, 2016). 
Thus, in the aftermath of PA, there were calls for 
increasing ambitiousness of both the overall EU climate 
target as well at the level of a cornerstone climate poli-
cy instrument. The former was related to the PA (and 
was rejected, see previous section), while the latter 
came as a response to a price drop. A possible strategy 
would be to attach such efforts to ongoing ETS reform 
discussions that were launched in mid-2015 following 
the adoption of the MSR (European Commission, 
2015b). Up until mid-2016 (a decision is expected in 
early 2017), the debate among policymakers and 
stakeholders had centered on carbon leakage and sup-
port for low-carbon R&D—aspects related to the cap 
had already been decided in practice by the European 
Council in October 2014 (Wettestad & Jevnaker, 2016). 
Thus, the ongoing ETS discussions seemed to proceed 
unaffected by the PA. Instead, actors jumped on the 
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price drop to justify further tightening of the system. 
However, the timing is complicated, as the EU has just 
concluded a heated and complicated process that ended 
in the adoption of the MSR. Central Commission officials 
including Climate and Energy Commissioner Cañete, 
have signaled disapproval of new tightening measures 
before the MSR has started to work. Moreover, the in-
terest in shielding and supporting European businesses 
has remained in place and weigh heavy in current dis-
cussions, seemingly unaffected by the advent of a global 
climate agreement. Thus, neither the legal nor the politi-
cal pathway have turned out to be important so far, as is 
the case for the bureaucratic/administrative pathway: 
follow-up procedures from the PA have not been con-
nected to the ongoing discussion of ETS reform, which is 
likely to have been concluded by the time that the EU 
starts preparing for the review. 
Could the PA become more important for ETS re-
form in the future? Without mandatory implementa-
tion of a given instrument, the legal pathway seems less 
relevant for this particular process. As to the bureaucrat-
ic/administrative pathway, entering the PA review cycle 
might affect future ETS discussions, and the MSR review 
in 2023 could follow up on PA deliverables due the same 
year. This is related to the political pathway, which for 
the interaction between the PA and the EU ETS appears 
most interesting, although requires support from actors 
within all three EU institutions. Moreover, in light of the 
diverging views of climate policy in general among 
member-states (Poland being partly compensated, part-
ly overrun by Germany in the MSR process), strategic 
use of the PA to garner support for ETS reform across 
the board might be counter-productive, especially be-
fore having concrete evidence of comparable climate ef-
forts emerging outside the EU. As such, successful Chi-
nese carbon trading might trigger an interesting dynamic 
also inside the EU. As things stand now, however, the 
case of the EU ETS shows that it will be challenging to 
use the PA in internal processes and that hopes in this 
regard should be realistic and moderate. 
5. Concluding Comments 
Most observers agree that the PA is a step in the right 
direction in the process towards a new approach for 
dealing with the challenge of climate change, but the 
overall significance of this agreement in a problem-
solving perspective is unknown. We have therefore fo-
cused on the potential impact of the PA—on the EU 
and carbon markets. We concluded that the dynamic 
structure of the agreement may trigger a follow-up 
process in the EU that could lead to greater ambitions 
beyond 2030. The combined impact through the politi-
cal, legal and bureaucratic/administrative pathways 
connecting the PA to the EU may also increase pres-
sure on laggards within the EU. The agreement did not 
create a new global trading regime but it could create 
some momentum for actors favoring this instrument. 
Regarding the EU ETS, the world’s largest carbon mar-
ket, the political pathway is of greatest interest for the 
prospects of further tightening of the system and 
boosting the carbon price. Still, it will be challenging to 
use the PA in these internal processes and hopes in this 
regard should therefore be modest. 
However important EU climate polices and carbon 
markets are for future international climate policies, 
the main challenges are elsewhere, primarily in devel-
oping countries. As these countries have previously had 
no “hard” commitments we believe the PA is an im-
portant step in bringing these countries on board. Equal-
ly important, the Paris Agreement contributed to restore 
the reputation of the UN as a major instrument in bring-
ing this process forward. Still, it is important to realize 
that this avenue is one among many in the increasingly 
complex nature of the overall climate regime. However, 
the PA is important in this broader context as it focuses 
strongly on the importance of including non-state actors, 
not the least business and industry, into the process. In 
order to realize the high ambitions of the Paris Agree-
ment non-state actors as well as states have to demon-
strate a political will to deal with the problem that has so 
far been absent. Whether this can be realized remains to 
be seen, but with the global framework in place the ball 
is squarely passed back to them. 
Conflict of Interests 
The authors declare no conflict of interests. 
References 
Andresen, S. (2015). Effectiveness. In P. Pattberg & F. 
Zelli (Eds.), Encyclopedia of global environmental 
governance (pp. 441-447). Cheltenham: Edward El-
gar. 
Boasson, E. L., & Wettestad, J. (2013). EU climate policy: 
Industry, policy interaction and external environ-
ment. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Bodansky, D. (2015, December 15). Reflections on the 
Paris Conference. Opinio Juris. Retrieved from http:// 
opiniojuris.org/2015/12/15/reflections-on-the-paris-
conference 
BusinessEurope. (2016). Views on the impact of the Paris 
agreement on the 2030 framework for climate and 




CAN Europe. (2015). CAN Europe’s assessment of the 
Paris Agreement. Retrieved from http://www.caneu 
rope.org/policy-work-articles/272-un-climate-negoti 
ations/943-our-assessment-of-the-paris-agreement 
Carbon Pulse. (2016). Comment: Resuscitating the EU 
ETS. Retrieved from http://carbon-pulse.com/17489 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 188-196 195 
Cortell, A.P., & Davis, J.W. Jr. (1996). Do international in-
stitutions matter? The domestic importance of inter-
national rules and norms. International Studies Quar-
terly, 40, 451-478. 
Dimantchev, E., & Schjølset, S. (2016). EU climate ambi-
tion: Falling short on long-term targets? Oslo: Thom-
son Reuters Point Carbon. 
Environmental Council. (2016). Outcome of the 3452nd 
Environment Council meeting, March 4, 2016. Re-
trieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ 
meetings/env/2016/03/04 
EurActive. (2015, September 18). Ministers unite on 
mandate for Paris climate talks. Retrieved from 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/mi
nisters-unite-on-mandate-for-paris-climate-talks/ 
Eurelectric. (2015, December 14). Eurelectric hails suc-
cessful outcome from Paris Climate Change Confer-
ence. Retrieved from http://www.eurelectric.org/ 
news/2015/eurelectric-hails-successful-outcome-
from-paris-climate-change-conference 
Eurofer. (2015). Position paper: Eurofer welcomed the 
global agreement. Brussels: Eurofer.  
European Commission. (2011). A roadmap for moving to 
a competitive low carbon economy in 2050. Brussels: 
European Commission. 
European Commission. (2015a). Historic deal in Paris: EU 
leads global efforts. European Commission. Retrieved 
from http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news 
_2015121201_en.htm 
European Commission. (2015b). Proposal for a directive 
of the European parliament and of the Council 
amending directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-
effective emission reductions and low-carbon invest-
ments. Brussels: European Commission. 
European Commission. (2016). The road from Paris. 
Brussels: European Commission. 
European Council. (2009, December 1). Presidency con-
clusions from European Council, October 29 and 30, 
2009. Brussels: European Council. 
European Council. (2014, October 24). Presidency con-
clusions from European Council, October 23 and 24, 
2014. Brussels: European Council. 
European Council. (2016, March 18). European Council 
conclusions, March 17 and 18. Brussels: European 
Council. 
FuelsEurope. (2015, December 18). COP21—EU negotia-
tors should be proud of what has been achieved in 
Paris, and should renew their efforts to ensure that it 





Haas, P. (2015, December 17). The day after Paris: politi-
cians hand the baton to green industries. The Con-
versation. Retrieved from http://theconversation. 
com/the-day-after-paris-politicians-hand-the-baton-
to-green-industries-51787 
Haas, P. M., Keohane, R. O., & Levy, M. A. (Eds.). (1993). 
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of effective interna-
tional environmental protection. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Jevnaker, T., & Wettestad, J. (2016). Linked carbon mar-
kets: Silver bullet, or castle in the air? Climate Law, 
6(1-2), 142-151. 
Levy, M. A, Young O. R., & Zurn, M. (1995). The study of 
international regimes. European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations, 1(3), 267-330. 
Oberthur, S., & Groen, L. (2016, May 11-13). Explaining 
success in international negotiations: The EU and the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Paper present-
ed at the EU in International Affairs Conference, 
Brussels, Belgium. 
European Parliament. (2015). COP21 Paris agreement: 
MEPs hail a new beginning for climate action [Press 




Politico. (2015, November 30). Poland takes a tough line 
ahead of COP21. Politico. Retrieved from http:// 
www.politico.eu/article/poland-tough-line-cop21-
paris-climate-summit 
Skjærseth, J. B. (2014). Implementing EU climate and en-
ergy policies in Poland: From Europeanization to 
Polonization? (FNI Report No. 8/2014). Lysaker, 
Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute. 
Skjærseth, J. B., Eikeland, P. O., Gulbrandsen, L. H., & 
Jevnaker, T. (2016). Linking EU climate and energy 
policies: decision-making, implementation and re-
form. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Skjærseth, J. B., Schram Stokke, O., & Wettestad, J. 
(2006). Soft law, hard law and effective implementa-
tion of environmental norms. Global Environmental 
Politics, 6(3), 104-121. 
Underdal, A. (2002). One question, two answers. In E. 
Miles, A. Underdal, S. Andresen, J. Wettestad, J. B. 
Skjærseth & E. Carlin (Ed.), Environmental regime ef-
fectiveness (pp. 3-47). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
van Asselt, H. (2016). The role of non-state actors in re-
viewing ambition, implementation and compliance 
under the Paris Agreement. Climate Law, 6, 91-108. 
Victor, D. (2015, December 15). Why Paris worked: A dif-
ferent approach to climate diplomacy. Yale Environ-
ment 360. Retrieved from http://e360.yale.edu/ 
feature/why_paris_worked_a_different_approach_ 
to_climate_diplomacy/2940/ 
Wettestad, J., & Jevnaker, T. (2016). Rescuing EU emis-
sions trading—The climate policy flagship. Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Pivot. 
Young, O. R. (1989). International cooperation: Building 
regimes for natural resources and the environment. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 188-196 196 
About the Authors 
 
Steinar Andresen is a research professor at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Norway. He has also been 
a professor at the Department of Political Science and an adjunct professor at the Faculty of law, both 
University of Oslo. He has also been affiliated with various international institutions as a guest re-
searcher. He has published extensively internationally, mostly on international environmental gov-
ernance. 
 
Jon Birger Skjærseth is a research professor at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute. His research interest fo-
cuses on various environmental challenges, including climate and energy policies and strategies at 
the corporate, national, EU and international levels. He has published extensively in these fields, in-
cluding a number of books. 
 
Torbjørg Jevnaker is a research fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and PhD candidate at the De-
partment of Political Science, University of Oslo. Her research interests include climate and energy 
market policy within the EU, organization studies and public administration. 
 
Jørgen Wettestad is a research professor at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute. He has published several 
books and numerous articles on international and EU environmental policy with particular attention 
to emission trading. His most recent book (together with Torbjørg Jevnaker) is Rescuing EU Emission 
Trading: The Climate Policy Flagship (Palgrave, 2016). 
 
